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Life and the homeostatic organization 
View of BioLogicaL Phenomena
robert arp
AbstrAct: in this paper, i argue that starting with the organelles that constitute a cell – and 
continuing up the hierarchy of components in processes and subsystems of an organism – there 
are clear instances of emergent biological phenomena that can be considered “living” entities. 
these components and their attending processes are living emergent phenomena because of 
the way in which the components are organized to maintain homeostasis of the organism at the 
various levels in the hierarchy. i call this view the homeostatic organization view (hoV) of biological 
phenomena and, as is shown, it comports well with the standard philosophical accounts of 
nomological (metaphysical) emergence and representational (epistemological) emergence. to 
proffer hoV, i describe properties of biological entities that include internal-hierarchical data 
exchange, data selectivity, informational integration, and environmental-organismic information 
exchange. further, a distinction is drawn between particularized homeostasis and generalized 
homeostasis, and i argue that because the various processes and subsystems of an organism are 
functioning properly in their internal environments (particularized homeostasis), the organism is 
able to exist as a hierarchically-organized entity in some environment external to it (generalized 
homeostasis). stated simply: that components of biological phenomena are organized to 
perform some function resulting in homeostasis marks them out to be living emergent entities 
distinguishable, in description and in reality, from the very physico-chemical processes of which 
they are composed.
Keywords: data selectivity, hierarchical organization, homeostasis, homeostatic organization 
View, information, informational integration, integration, selectivity
1. organisms, hierarchicaL organization, and homeostasis
Ultimately, it will be argued that the components and attending processes of an organism 
must be considered as living, emergent phenomena because of the way in which the 
components are organized to maintain homeostasis of the organism at the various levels 
in the organismic hierarchy. Before this is accomplished, however, it is necessary to 
show that the processes in which the components of this hierarchy are engaged produce 
homeostasis through abilities to internally exchange data, selectively convert data to 
information, integrate that information, and process information from environments.
in general, biologists and other researchers who describe biological phenomena are 
aligned with mayr (1996) in his description of organisms as “hierarchically organized 
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systems, operating on the basis of historically acquired programs of information” 
(gould, 2002; audesirk, audesirk, and Beyers, 2002; eldredge, 1995; Bogdan, 1994; 
Lycan, 1995; csányi, 1996; collier and hooker, 1999; arp, 2008a, 2005b; arp and 
ayala, 2008; arp and rosenberg, 2008; terzis and arp, 2008). what exactly is entailed 
in this description? an organism can be defined as: a hierarchically organized system made 
up of  components that are engaged in processes constituting coordinated subsystems, with the product 
of  these processes and subsystems being homeostasis relative to their operations, producing the overall 
homeostasis of  the system.
as a system, an organism is a unified entity that is explainable in terms of the properties 
of its components, the interactions of these components, and the overall coordination of 
these components. the reader may be aware of the fact that, in philosophy of science 
and philosophy of mind literature, it is now commonplace to find references to craver’s 
(2001) description of a mechanism hierarchy as some mechanism s, which is Ψ-ing, 
composed of smaller entity Xs, which are Φ-ing. these Xs are little mechanisms 
themselves consisting of smaller entity Ps, which are σ-ing. this view has the benefit 
of describing some mechanism as a hierarchically organized system, in a non-spooky 
fashion, consisting of entities engaging in inter and intra-leveled causally-efficacious 
activities. craver’s view of a hierarchical mechanism maps onto my schematization of a 
hierarchically-organized system, and our two views have much in common. however, 
as i will show in the final section of this paper, his view is lacking certain conditions that 
enable one to distinguish living systems from non-living ones.
now, to understand what it means for an organism to be a hierarchically organized 
system, we need to investigate the properties of the components of this kind of system. 
these properties include what i call the following:
internal-hierarchical data exchangea. 
data selectivityB. 
informational integrationc. 
environmental-organismic information exchanged. 
while describing each of these properties, the interactions of the components of this 
kind of system, as well as the overall coordination of these components will become 
evident (also see arp, 2005b, 2008a). however, before investigating internal-hierarchical 
data exchange in an organism, it is necessary to explicate further the words component 
and homeostasis utilized in the above definition of an organism.
the word component is a term that can be used analogously to refer to either a part 
of a process, a part of a subsystem, or a part of a system. in the most general of terms, 
an organism is a unified system made up of subsystems. in turn, these subsystems are 
made up of processes, and these processes are the activities in which the components 
are engaged. the components of an organism range from the organelles performing 
processes in a cell, to cells performing processes in an organ, to organs performing 
processes in a subsystem, to subsystems performing processes in the whole system 
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itself, i.e., the organism. so for example, the respiratory subsystem works with other 
subsystems in an organism like a dog to maintain its life: the respiratory subsystem 
would be considered as one component of the entire dog, envisioned as one whole 
system; the lung would be considered as one component of the respiratory subsystem of 
the dog; lung cellular tissue comprising one of the lobes of its lung would be considered 
as one component of the lung; and the particular kind of cell that comprises lung tissue 
is made up of organelles, the basic components of cells.
homeostasis refers to: the relatively constant or stable coordination of functioning 
among the components in the organismic hierarchy, given the interaction of these 
components with environmental pressures internal to and external to the organism. 
there are environments exerting pressures upon the subsystems and processes internal 
to an organism, as well as environments exerting pressures upon the organism as a 
whole that are external to it. the components that make up an organism, as well as 
the organism itself, are able to respond effectively to the ever-changing environmental 
pressures by adjusting and re-adjusting their activities so as to continue their respective 
operations with a degree of stability. when a subsystem or process in an organism is 
operating with a degree of stability, despite environmental pressures – e.g., when the cell 
wall actually performs the activity of allowing nutrients into the cell, or when a heart 
actually performs the activity of pumping blood, or when the body of an animal actually 
cools itself through perspiration because its temperature has been raised above a certain 
degree – it is said to be functioning properly.
a distinction can be drawn between particularized homeostasis and generalized homeostasis. 
Particularized homeostasis refers to the end product of the proper functioning of 
the particular processes and subsystems in an organism being the relatively constant 
coordination among the components that make up the processes and subsystems, given 
environmental pressures that are internal to the organism. generalized homeostasis 
refers to the overall maintenance of an organism being the result of the proper functioning 
of the processes and subsystems, given environmental pressures that are external to the 
organism. the overall homeostasis of the organism is maintained because homeostasis 
is maintained at the levels of the subsystems and processes comprising the organism.
if the various processes and subsystems of an organism are functioning properly 
in their internal environments – thereby producing particularized homeostasis – the 
organism is able to function effectively in some environment external to it. this proper 
functioning that yields internal homeostasis takes place at levels in the hierarchy of 
the organism ranging from the coordinated activities of organelles in the cell, to cells 
performing coordinated processes in an organ, to organs performing coordinated 
processes in a subsystem, to subsystems performing coordinated activities in an organism. 
so, taking the previous example of the dog: the dog is able to live its life in some external 
environment precisely because of the overall relatively constant coordination of the 
subsystems in its body; in turn a particular subsystem, like the respiratory subsystem, 
functions properly because of the relatively constant coordination of cellular processes; 
and the cells themselves function properly because of the relatively constant coordination 
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among the various organelles.
the subsystems and processes of an organism can be understood as functioning at 
various levels of operation from lower levels to higher levels. the determination of a 
subsystem as existing at a certain level depends upon the way in which the processes 
of the subsystem operate, and in turn, the way in which the subsystems operate in 
the organism as a whole. Lower-level processes operate in certain ways, and form the 
basis for higher-level processes and subsystems. in turn, higher-level subsystems and 
processes are comprised of lower-level processes, and utilize the information from these 
lower-levels to perform their own operations. in this sense, along with audesirk et al. 
(2002), Lycan (1995), and salthe and matsuno (1995), it could be said that higher-level 
subsystems are the phenomena that literally emerge from lower-level subsystems and 
processes (also see the relevant papers in arp and ayala, 2008; arp and rosenbeg, 
2008; terzis and arp, 2008). more will be said about emergence in the final section of 
this paper.
the organism can be conceptualized as a hierarchical organization whereby levels 
of operation, in the forms of subsystems and processes, function interdependently with 
one another in this unified system. a schematization of this hierarchical system is shown 
in diagram 1.
Diagram 1: A hierarchically organized system
the organism is represented by the large partitioned triangle that contains the smaller 
partitioned triangles within it: the biggest triangles within the one large triangle 
represent subsystems; the smaller triangles within those subsystems represent processes; 
the smallest triangles within those processes represent components of processes; and the 
partitions represent levels of operation. some of the triangles overlap, signifying that the 
subsystems are interdependently related to one another. for example, in a hierarchically 
ordered system like the mammal, the nervous (sub)system is dependent upon the 
respiratory and circular (sub)systems, primarily for a process of oxygen transfer to the 
nerve cells and brain cells of the nervous (sub)system. at the same time, the processes 
of the respiratory and circular (sub)systems are dependent upon the processes of the 
nervous (sub)system, found specifically in the medulla of the brain, for their activities. 
(again, we can recall craver’s description of a mechanism hierarchy as some mechanism 
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s, which is Ψ-ing, composed of smaller entity Xs, which are Φ-ing. these Xs are little 
mechanisms themselves consisting of smaller entity Ps, which are σ-ing.) 
2. internaL-hierarchicaL data eXchange
the question now arises as to how it is possible for the operations in this biological 
hierarchy to be carried out at a certain level, and also how the operations at lower levels 
are able to affect and be effected by higher levels, and vice versa. this is accomplished 
by what i call internal-hierarchical data exchange. this refers to the fact that data must freely 
flow between and among the various levels of the organism. data are the raw materials that 
are of  the kind that have the potential to be useful for a process or operation. data are exchanged 
between the components at one level of operation, among the various processes of a 
subsystem, and among the subsystems that make up the organism as a whole. in this 
sense, the operations and processes must exhibit a certain amount of malleability and 
flexibility so that data can actually be exchanged. data can take the physical form of an 
electrical charge, an electron, a molecule, or a chemical transmitter. examples of this 
kind of data exchange abound in organisms, but we will take a look at one representative 
example.
a euglena is a one-celled microorganism that is a member of the Protist kingdom; 
in colloquial terms, it is known as a kind of algae (see diagram 2). euglenas are about 
10 micrometers in length and look like a sperm cell with a more elongated body. they 
are equipped with a flagellum, eyespot, vacuoles, chloroplasts, plastids, and a cell 
nucleus. each one of these components has a function: the flagellum is a whip-like tail 
that enables the euglena to move around; the eyespot is light/dark sensitive so that 
the euglena can move toward sunlight, its food source; vacuoles allow for wastes to be 
disposed; chloroplasts transform sunlight to energy and food; plastids store the food; the 
cell nucleus contains a nucleolus that synthesizes and encodes ribosomal rna, which is 
important for euglena structure and reproduction.
Diagram 2: A euglena
referring again to the aforementioned hierarchical model, an organism is an 
organized system composed of subsystems that are made up of components engaged 
in processes whose activities produce the particularized and generalized homeostasis 
of the system. for an organism like the euglena to function effectively in some external 
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environment – basically, live its existence in its little microbial world – it is necessary 
that data be exchanged between and among the various subsystems of this system. 
food storage in the euglena can be viewed as a subsystem activity, which itself is made 
up of processes concerning electron transport and oxygen exchange in photosynthesis. 
in this activity, the data consist of electrons and oxygen molecules. the data must be 
exchanged between the two processes; otherwise, there would be no storage of food. at 
the same time, this subsystem works with the subsystems concerning food acquisition and 
mobility. if data were not being exchanged between the eyespot and the flagellum, then 
there would be no movement toward sunlight; in turn, there would be no photosynthesis, 
and then no food storage.
3. data seLectiVitY
raw data are exchanged between and among the various subsystems and processes of 
the organism. however, not every piece of data is relevant or useful to a subsystem or 
process. there must be some property of the components of an organism that allows 
for discrimination or parsing between relevant and irrelevant data. once a piece of 
data has been selected as useful for a process, it becomes informative for the process; the 
selected datum ceases to be potentially useful and becomes actual information. raw data 
have the potential to become information, and information can be understood as data 
of  the kind that have been selected for their usefulness for a process or system in an organism. so, there 
are actually three categories of data: (a) data that are not of the kind that is either useful 
or not useful for a subsystem or process; (b) data that are of the kind that is not useful for 
a subsystem or process; and (c) data that are of the kind that is useful for a subsystem or 
process, viz., information (see terzis and arp, 2008).
the term information can be defined in different ways, usually depending upon the 
intended goals of a particular intellectual discipline or methodology employed. some 
molecular biologists use the term in the spirit of shannon (1948) and weaver and 
shannon’s (1949) information theory to describe any general communicative process 
that selects one or more objects from a set of objects (terzis and arp, 2008; sacco, 
copes, sloyer, and stark, 1988; schneider, 1986; Pierce, 1980). however, a few more 
conditions should be added to this definition in order to make it more appropriate for 
our discussion.
first, given the molecular biologist’s definition, it is correct to say that information 
entails a selective process. as has been noted already, it is the selective capacity of the 
components of an organism that enables raw data to be considered as information. 
consider that there are a multitude of activities being performed by organelles within 
the eukaryotic cell. the plasma membrane is the phospholipid bilayer that acts as the 
cell’s shell. in the processes of endocytosis and exocytosis, materials are moved into and 
out of the cell through the plasma membrane. however, not just any material is allowed into 
or out of the cell. there must be some mechanism of discrimination employed in these 
processes so that the correct kinds of organic molecules come into the cell as nutrients, and 
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the correct kinds of organic molecules get expelled as wastes. the data being exchanged 
in both cases are organic molecules. But the cell processes can discriminate and select 
which molecules are useful, and which molecules are harmful. this “discrimination” 
process is not some “spooky” vitalist phenomenon, and more will be said about this 
process in later sections of this paper.
second, these molecular biologists describe information as a communicative 
process. this seems correct as information is a kind of medium between on one hand, 
something doing the communicating, and on the other hand, something doing the 
receiving in some environment. in other words, communication of information entails 
that there be some kind of afferent entity and some kind of efferent entity, as well as some 
kind of environment in which this communication can occur. insofar as this is the case, 
information can be considered as a:
communication on the part of some afferent entity (the communicator) that evokes a 
change or modification in the efferent entity (the receiver) in an environment, influencing 
the subsequent activity of the efferent entity.
Using our example of the eukaryotic cell, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen molecules 
(the communicator) pass by the plasma membrane (the receiver), and can be understood 
as informative and incorporated into the body of the cell as energy (the influence). 
conversely, organic molecules that are expelled as wastes by cell a (the communicator) 
can be understood as informative for nearby cell B (the receiver), to the extent that cell 
B does not try to intake cell a’s waste (the influence).
having both defined information and described the conditions concerning 
information exchange, we now can give a few more examples of this kind of activity in 
organisms.
Example 1. successful gene transfer in reproduction entails that genetic information 
is passed along from parent organism to offspring organism (audesirk et al., 2002; mayr, 
1997; Voet, Voet, and Pratt, 2002; campbell and reece, 1999; williams, 1992). the 
parent organism acts as the communicator, the offspring as receiver. the genetic code is 
the information that is communicated from parent to organism. the offspring is affected 
by this genetic information, since such information determines the offspring’s structure 
and activity. the genetic information is stored in the dna located in the nucleus of the 
cell and, in conjunction with environmental factors, continually shapes the structure 
and activity of the organism throughout its lifespan.
Example 2. cells use energy, and one of the primary functions of the mitochondrion 
of an animal cell is to produce energy for the cell by converting sugars into a nucleic 
acid called atP. however, this can happen only if there is a line of communication 
between other organelles of the cell and the mitochondria themselves. atP acts as 
the material catalyst of information communicated between mitochondrion and other 
organelles. when there are low levels of atP, the mitochondria receive this information 
and convert more sugars; conversely, when sugars are converted (this activity, among 
other activities), the other organelles receive this information and cellular homeostasis 
can be maintained (audesirk et al., 2002; allman, 2000; Voet et al., 2002; campbell and 
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reece, 1999).
Example 3. a clear illustration of the communication of information in a systemic 
fashion is a mammal’s muscle coordination in a reflex arc. in this activity, information is 
communicated to and from the spinal cord and a particular muscle group of the body 
(Kandel et al., 2000; audesirk et al., 2002; Pelligrino, fadiga, fogassi, galleste, and 
rizzolatti, 1992). consider a situation where a very curious cat decides to jump atop a 
very hot stove. the intense motion of the molecules from the stovetop impress themselves 
upon the pads of the cat’s paws. that motion affects the sensory neurons in the cat’s skin, 
causing them to fire. the sensory neurons send a message to the interneurons and, in 
turn, a message is sent through motor neurons to the spinal cord. these messages consist 
of billions of action potentials and neurotransmitter releases, affecting cell after cell that 
is along the pathway of this particular reflex arc. in an instant, the spinal cord then 
sends a message back to the muscle groups associated with the cat’s legs, diaphragm and 
back. in a flash, the cat jumps off the stove, screaming while arching its back. however, 
now the cat must coordinate its fall to the ground. this time, information is sent from 
the visual system to the brain, and then back through the spinal cord to other muscles 
in the cat’s body. all of this information must be integrated by the brain, and motor 
responses must be orchestrated by the combined effort of brain-body communication 
of information. the cat narrowly avoids falling into the garbage can placed next to the 
stove.
we can now be more precise concerning the kind of activities in which organisms 
are engaged. this fourth example not only helps to demonstrate how information 
is communicated in organisms, it also serves to bolster the claim that organisms are 
hierarchically organized systems of  information exchange. this is so because information must flow 
between the subsystems of the organism, as well as within the particularized processes of 
the subsystems themselves, in order for an organized expression of the organism’s activity 
to take place. our curious cat utilized – at least – the endocrine, nervous, muscular, 
respiratory, skeletal, and visual subsystems in its body while jumping, screaming, and 
negotiating space. similarly, for a euglena there must be a flow of information between 
eyespot and flagellum in food acquisition, just as there must be a flow of information 
between chloroplasts and plastids in food storage.
Diagram 3: The major organelles of  the animal cell
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finally, consider all of the information being exchanged between and among the 
organelles of an animal cell. the nucleus is in constant communication with each 
mitochondrion, centriole, golgi apparatus, ribosome, and endoplasmic reticulum, each 
of which has its own function in maintaining the overall homeostasis of the cell (see 
diagram 3): the nucleus contains the nucleolus and houses dna; the mitochondrion 
supplies the cell with energy; centrioles are important for cell division; the golgi 
apparatus stores proteins; ribosomes are the sites for protein synthesis; the endoplasmic 
reticulum expedites the transport of cellular material; the plasma membrane permits 
materials to move into and out of the cell.
4. informationaL integration
the mere fact that information is exchanged among the various processes and subsystems 
of an organism does not seem to capture fully or adequately the nature of an organism 
as a hierarchically organized system. the distinction between higher and lower levels in 
a hierarchy suggests that the higher levels exhibit significant control over the lower levels. 
there seem to be heuristic mechanisms that emerge from the complex operations of 
processes and subsystems. this makes sense since the more complex some process or 
system becomes, the more there is a need for mechanisms of control so that the process or 
system can operate efficiently. these mechanisms are like command centers where activity 
can be integrated and monitored, much like the cPU of a computer. in fact, sperber 
(1994), dennett (1991), Johnson-Laird (1988), cziko (1995), and dawkins (1986), each 
in their own way, envision computational systems equipped with cPUs as appropriate 
models of biological processes (also see arp, 2005a, 2006a, 2007a, 2008a, 2008b).
now, there are at least two modes of control present in an organism conceived 
of as a hierarchically organized system, viz., selectivity and integration. already, we have 
seen that selectivity is a mode of control since this property of an organism acts as a 
kind of filtering mechanism that distinguishes raw data from information. Biologists 
and evolutionary theorists use the word constraint to describe mechanisms of selectivity 
associated with organisms, whether they are talking about cellular processes (rosen, 
1968), embryological development (amundson, 1994), visual attentiveness (hatfield, 
1999), the fight or flee response (nesse and abelson, 1995), organismic homeostasis 
(audesirk et al., 2002), or the adaptability of organisms to environments (gould, 1980; 
darwin, 1859).
in the three examples from the previous section, we can describe forms of selectivity 
that manifest a mode of control. in example 1, genetic information is passed along 
from parent to offspring, but the gene transfer in reproduction is restricted to a particular 
species. genetic information cannot pass from euglena to cat, or from human to euglena, 
for example (mayr, 1976; hastings, 1998; Kitcher, 1992). with respect to example 
2, mitochondria are said to filter any excess glucose to facilitate cellular homeostasis 
(audesirk et al., 2002; allman, 2000). finally, in example 3 the brain ultimately can 
control the amount of force exerted in a jump (Kandel et al., 2000; cziko, 1992; cziko, 
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1995; Pelligrino, fadiga, fogassi, gallese, and rizzolatti, 1992).
once useful data have been selected for – thereby becoming information – they still 
need to be integrated into the overall workings of a process or subsystem. Informational 
integration is another mode of control in the organism viewed as a hierarchically 
organized system, and refers to the fact that the various processes and subsystems in 
an organism are equipped with a capacity to organize the information that has been 
selected for by the processes and subsystems so that, ultimately, generalized homeostasis 
can be achieved. Processes and subsystems achieve particularized homeostasis, the 
results of which contribute to generalized homeostasis in an organism. if there were 
not some mechanism by which the pieces of information were organized in processes 
and subsystems, then the hierarchy would not achieve generalized homeostasis, thereby 
ceasing to function or, at least, ceasing to function optimally in some environment 
external to it. selectivity and integration are like two sides of the same coin concerning 
control in an organism conceived of as a hierarchical organization – both are needed 
for proper functioning of the components and, consequently, for particularized and 
generalized homeostasis of the organism (see arp, 2005a, 2008a, 2008b).
consider an analogous thought experiment: if a painter selects all of the colors for a 
painting, but then splashes the colors on the canvass in a random fashion, there would be 
no organized piece of art produced (unless the goal is some modern art piece intended to 
be randomized). or, consider that the very idea of a system entails a coordination of the 
components that make up the referent of such an idea. what would happen to a system 
if there were no integration of information to be found therein, i.e., no coordination of 
components in the processes and subsystems that make up such a thing? the system 
would cease to be known as, and cease to be a system, really. instead it would be known 
as, as well as become, an aggregate of some sort. wimsatt (1994, 1997), zylstra (1992), 
and salthe and matsuno (1995) view the coordination of components as a necessary 
condition for some thing’s being considered as a system.
informational integration is achieved at many levels in an organism, from the 
coordinated functions of organelles in a cell, to the coordinated cellular processes in an 
organ, to the coordinated activities of organs in a subsystem, to the overall coordination 
of the subsystems of the organism. further, in a multi-cellular organism like an animal, 
all of these processes and subsystems function together in coordinated ways to produce 
the generalized homeostasis of the organism. the image of a triangle used in diagram 
1 is all the more appropriate as a schematization of an organismic hierarchy, in light of 
this property of organisms. the subsystems near the top part of the triangle control the 
entire system, just as the processes near the top of a subsystem control the subsystem, 
through the integration of information received from lower levels. analogously, we can 
think of organizations like the catholic church or a corporation as manifesting this 
triangular model in their own actions and interactions. the Pope and other Bishops 
are at the top of the church triangle, and exhibit control over the rest of the church 
as a whole. so too, the corporate members (ceo, cfo, etc,) are at the top of the 
corporation triangle, and exhibit control over the corporation as a whole.
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this kind of control exhibited in the dual properties of data selectivity and 
informational integration can be likened to what is referred to in the literature in 
philosophy of science and philosophy of mind as downward causation, whereby a higher-
level phenomenon in a system causally influences lower levels. for example, Kim (1993, 
1995, 1999) sees downward causation as essential for phenomena described as emergent 
systems such as organisms and, more specifically, conscious organisms. further, the 
property of internal-hierarchical data exchange i have described includes what could be 
considered upward causation, whereby lower-levels in a system causally influences higher 
levels. for example, part of emmeche, Køppe, and stjernfelt’s (2000) idea of inclusiveness 
in biological systems entails the emergence of higher-level phenomena—like the 
biological from the chemical—whereby the biological is still causally dependent upon 
the chemical. also, searle (2004, 1992) continues to maintain his position in philosophy 
of mind concerning biological naturalism, whereby consciousness is not metaphysically 
reduced, although it is causally reduced, to neurobiology, indicating an upward form of 
causation (also see arp, 2004a, 2004b).
5. enVironmentaL-organismic information eXchange
organisms interact with external environments. however, because organisms are 
hierarchically organized living systems composed of subsystems, processes, and 
components engaged in various operations, they have their own internal environments 
as well. an environment can be defined as any pressure or force that aids in the producing 
of some change in the organism’s structure and functioning. we can draw a distinction 
between the information that is exchanged within the organism’s environment and the 
information that is exchanged between the external environment and the organism. so, 
there are really two types of environments, viz., environments that are internal to an 
organism and environments that are external to an organism.
an environment is not limited to the external world surrounding an organism. there 
are environments internal to the organism. for example, the other organelles, nucleus, 
atP, water, and various organic molecules act as the environment for a mitochondrion 
in the eukaryotic cell. also, other eukaryotic cells, cancerous cells, water, and all kinds of 
organic molecules and chemical elements act as the environment for a typical eukaryotic 
cell. a myriad of molecules including hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen surround 
and exert influence upon organs in a multi-cellular organism’s body. further, a piece 
of food taken in from the environment external to the organism becomes part of the 
environment within the organism and, depending on the content, may be digested or 
expelled.
these facts concerning internal environmental pressure add to the picture of an 
organism as a hierarchically organized system. within this kind of living system, there 
are levels distinguishable from other levels. one way to describe the distinction is by 
comparing a certain level, say level(n), with other levels that act as environments exerting 
pressures, exchanging data, and communicating information with level(n). once again, 
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we can refer to the schematization of triangles in diagram 1 that is supposed to represent 
an organismic hierarchy; however, now the smaller triangles within the one large triangle 
can be conceived of as situated within the context of internal environments.
at the same time, the organism itself is interacting with external environments 
that are exerting pressures, exchanging data, and communicating information with 
the organism. concerning environments that are external to the organism, we see that 
organisms are members of species that live in populations. these populations usually 
co-exist with other populations in communities. many communities living with their 
non-living surroundings comprise an ecosystem, and the sum of all ecosystems make up 
the biosphere of the earth. other members of a species, different species, and the non-
living surroundings of an organism are all considered parts of the external environment 
for an organism. the organism constantly experiences environmental pressures, and 
these pressures can be described in terms of information that is exchanged between the 
environment and the organism.
external environmental information affects an organism in a one-way, environment-
to-organism, external-to-internal causal fashion. this kind of information exchange can 
be witnessed as a result of research accrued and experiments performed by biologists 
and other thinkers.
it is common knowledge that an organism’s survival is dependent upon both genetic 
and environmental factors. for example, if there is an alteration in a rodent’s genetic 
makeup causing it to have a malformed foot, then it is more likely to be eaten by a hawk 
out on the open range. however, if the same handicapped rodent lives in a forested 
area where it can hide under rocks and bushes, it is less likely to become a predator’s 
victim. also, if an environment happens to be made up of trees having fruit high up on 
its branches, and it just so happens that a fruit-eating animal’s genes coded it to have a 
neck long enough to reach the fruit, then such an animal likely will survive. conversely, 
if your animal genes coded you to have a short neck, it is unlikely you would survive 
in such an environment (that is, if the fruit high up in the trees were your only food 
source). in the words of Berra (1990, p. 8): “the environment is the selecting agent, and 
because the environment changes over time and from one region to another, different 
variants will be selected under different environmental conditions.” these examples 
illustrate that there is a one-way, external-to-internal exchange of information between 
an environment and an organism existing in that environment.
another famous example that illustrates the informational transfer between the 
environment and an organism in a one-way, external-to-internal fashion has to do with 
the finches that darwin (1859) described on the galapagos islands during his voyage on 
The Beagle. these finches clearly exhibit adaptive radiation, i.e., in the words of Berra (1990, 
p. 163): “the evolutionary divergence of members of a single phylogenetic lineage into a 
variety of ecological roles usually resulting, in a short period of time, in the appearance 
of several or many new species.” darwin noted several different beak shapes and sizes 
that apparently were modified in the finches, depending upon the ecological niche the 
particular bird inhabited. some finches had massive beaks ideal for crushing their seed 
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food source, others had thinner pointed beaks ideal for probing flowers, still others had 
curved beaks ideal for picking food out of woody holes. in this set of circumstances, the 
environments in which the various finches inhabited were all different, and the finches 
with beaks most fit for a particular environment survived to reproduce.
Phenotypic traits are the physiological characteristics or behaviors of organisms 
that are under genetic control. the genetic information determines what a particular 
member of a species will look like, how fast it will run, what coloration it will have, how 
successful it will be at mating, etc. in the finch example, the different beaks represent the 
variety of phenotypic characteristics under genetic influence. if it just so happened that 
a certain beak style was effective in gathering food in an environment, then that finch 
would survive and pass its genes onto its progeny. soon, that particular niche would be 
dominated by the beak style that was most fit for that environment.
research has been conducted on animals to determine how the external environment 
affects the functioning of various systems of the body. one experiment has to do with 
occluding or removing the eyes of cats, rats, and birds at various stages of development 
to see if the neural connections of the brain necessary to the visual system either would 
develop abnormally, or cease to function altogether. these studies indicated that when 
occluding or removing the eyes, certain neural connections in the brains of these animals 
would not be made. this resulted in the cessation of certain visual processes, causing the 
overall subsystem to be under-developed in relation to other animals that have not had 
their eyes occluded or removed (cziko, 1995). this research illustrates what happens 
when information is not exchanged between environment and organism.
a further example that demonstrates environment-to-organism, external-internal 
information exchange has to do with research on the fruit fly, Drosophila. experimenters 
are able to take out, move around, or add genetic sequences in the dna of the fly, 
causing radical phenotypic alterations to result such as the deletion of some organ, 
legs growing where antennae should be, and antennae growing where legs should be. 
the experimenter’s adjustments to the genetic code of the fruit fly are analogous to 
the radioactive material and other kinds of natural external forces of mutation that 
alter the genetic codes of fruit fly populations. we find similar monstrosities in fruit 
flies when we study them in their natural habitats (duncan, Burgess, & duncan, 
1998). Just as researchers tap into and alter the genetic codes of fruit flies in controlled 
experiments, so too, external forces “tap into” and alter the genetic makeup of fruit fly 
populations in nature. these fruit fly abnormalities are another example of the property 
of environmental-organismic information exchange found in organisms.
6. organisms, emergence, and redUction
the attempt has been made to show that the processes in which the components of an 
organismic hierarchy are engaged produce homeostasis through abilities to internally 
exchange data, selectively convert data to information, integrate that information, and 
process information from environments. now, it will be argued that the components and 
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attending processes of an organism must be considered as living, emergent phenomena 
because of the way in which the components are organized to maintain homeostasis of 
the organism at the various levels in the organismic hierarchy. near the end of section 1, 
the claim was made that higher-level subsystems are the phenomena that literally emerge 
from lower-level subsystems and processes of an organism conceived of as a hierarchically 
organized living entity. with respect to organisms, certain forms of metaphysical and 
epistemological emergence will be endorsed in this final section of the paper.
as silberstein (2002, 2001), silberstein and mcgreever (1999), and mcLaughlin 
(1992) have clarified, there are metaphysical and epistemological forms of emergentism. 
according to metaphysical emergentists, entities, properties, or substances arise out of 
more fundamental entities, properties, or substances and yet, are not wholly reducible 
to them. in Kim’s (1995) words: “a property of a complex system is said to be ‘emergent’ 
just in case, although it arises out of the properties and relations characterizing 
simpler constituents, it is neither predictable from, nor reducible to, these lower-level 
characteristics” (p. 224; also see the discussions in Kim, 1999; wimsatt 1994, 1997; 
emmeche, Køppe, and stjernfelt, 2000; craver, 2001; Lowe, 2000; mcLaughlin, 
1997; o’connor, 1994; rueger, 2000; and zylstra, 1992). according to epistemological 
emergentists, the concepts, theories, models, or frameworks we utilize to describe 
phenomena at a certain level are non-reducible to the concepts, theories, etc., at a lower 
level (see, for example, the discussions in Batterman, 2001; cartwright, 1999; Primas, 
1998; sklar, 1999; dupré, 1993; crane, 2001; and Van gulick, 2001).
further, as silberstein (2002) and silberstein and mcgeever (1999) clarify, within 
the genera of metaphysical emergence four kinds have been distinguished, viz., non-
elimination, non-identity, mereological emergence, and nomological emergence. also, 
within the genera of epistemological emergence, at least two kinds of approaches have 
been distinguished, viz., predictive/explanatory emergence and representational/
cognitive emergence. in light of the previous sections of this paper, the metaphysical 
and epistemological forms of emergence that will be explored and defended in this 
section are:
nomological emergence, understood by silberstein (2002) as “cases in which 1. 
higher-level entities, properties, etc., are governed by higher-level laws that are 
not determined by or necessitated by the fundamental laws of physics governing 
the structure and behavior of their most basic physical parts” (p. 91).
representational/cognitive emergence, understood by silberstein (2002) 2. 
as the thesis that “wholes (systems) exhibit features, patterns or regularities 
that cannot be fully represented (understood) using the theoretical and 
representational resources adequate for describing and understanding the 
features and regularities of their more basic parts and the relations between 
those more basic parts” (p. 92).
from the metaphysical perspective, nomological emergentists deny the general 
principle that the whole can be accounted for fully in terms of the parts, and so their 
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view is contrasted with nomological reductionism. according to nomological reductionists, 
there are really no entities, properties, or substances that arise out of more fundamental 
ones since, once the more fundamental ones have been described, that is all there is to 
the reality of an entity, property, or substance. so for example, when people speak about 
water, they may take it to be a substance in its own right. however, according to the 
nomological reductionist, water just is hydrogen and oxygen – nothing new emerges when 
two hydrogen molecules combine with one oxygen molecule. conversely, according to 
a nomological emergentist there is something about water, e.g., its liquidity or liquid 
property, that emerges from the hydrogen and oxygen molecules, making it such that 
this liquidity exists on a separate metaphysical plane from the molecules on which it 
depends. after all, reason nomological emergentists, liquidity appears to be something 
distinct from hydrogen and oxygen molecules, as well as their chemical bond.
from the epistemological perspective, representational emergentists are contrasted 
with representational/theoretical reductionists who attempt to reduce concepts, 
theories, etc., to their lowest common denominator, as it were, and this usually means 
a description in terms of physico-chemical entities, properties, or substances and 
their attending laws or principles. so if we took the cell as an example, according to 
a representational reductionist the cell can be described completely within a physico-
chemical framework of concepts, theories, models, laws, etc. (see the discussions in 
churchland, 1995; humphreys, 1997; Primas, 1998). issues surrounding epistemological 
emergence and reduction are particularly poignant when describing organisms. this is 
so because it would appear that biology has its own set of laws and organisms have their 
own sets of properties that, despite being dependent upon physico-chemical laws and 
properties, are non-reducible to them (see mayr, 1969, 1996). in biological matters, an 
anti-reductionist’s use of epistemological emergence accepts or implies that biological 
descriptions may emerge that are not reducible, even in principle, to physico-chemical 
descriptions. so, the issue thinkers confront when trying to give a description of organisms 
and the functioning of their components can be put in the form of a question: has the 
biologist given us a description of organisms and the functioning of their parts that is 
so basic as to be unachievable by a physico-chemical description? in other words, in 
describing organisms and the functions of their systems and processes, does the biologist 
give us something that the physicist or chemist leaves out?
7. the homeostatic organization View of BioLogicaL 
Phenomena
some emergentists maintain that chemical bonds or basic physical structures – as well 
as our descriptions of them – are non-reducible to the molecules and atoms of which 
they are composed. so, there is an emergence-reduction divide even at the physico-
chemical level (see, for example, the discussions in hendry, 1999; hellman, 1999; 
Belot and earman, 1997). this physico-chemical debate is avoided here, and instead i 
maintain that starting with the organelles that constitute a cell, and continuing up the hierarchy 
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of components in processes and subsystems of an organism, we have clear instances of 
living, emergent biological phenomena. the fundamental reason why these components 
and their attending processes must be considered as emergent phenomena has to do 
with the way in which the components are organized to maintain homeostasis of  the organism 
at the various levels in the hierarchy. i call this position the homeostatic organization view 
(hoV) of biological phenomena. since homeostasis is ubiquitous as both a concept and 
as a recognized reality in biological, psychological, and philosophical communities (among 
many other disciplines), it makes for a natural point of discussion in the emergence/
reduction debate.
in section 1, a distinction was drawn between particularized homeostasis and 
generalized homeostasis. it was shown that because the various processes and subsystems 
of an organism are functioning properly in their internal environments (particularized 
homeostasis), the organism is able to live its life effectively in some environment external 
to it (generalized homeostasis). here, the very existence of components and their 
activities at various levels in the organism’s hierarchy is linked to the coordination of 
such components so as ultimately to produce generalized homeostasis. the components of an 
organism are organized in such a way that the resultant outcome of their processes 
becomes first, particularized homeostasis, and then, generalized homeostasis. That 
components are organized to perform some function resulting in homeostasis is one 
feature that marks them out to be novel emergent entities distinguishable from the very 
physico-chemical processes of which they are composed.
it was noted already that homeostasis first occurs at the basic level of the organized 
coordination of the activities of organelles in a cell. researchers like audesirk et al. 
(2002), Kandel, schwartz, and Jessell (2000), Voet, Voet, and Pratt (2002), campbell and 
reece (1999), and smolensky (1988) document cellular homeostasis. at this basic level 
of organelle interaction within the cell, we also would have the first instances of salient 
emergent biological properties that are distinct from the physico-chemical properties 
upon which they depend. recall all of the information being exchanged between and 
among the organelles of an animal cell spoken about and schematized in diagram 3 a 
few pages back. the nucleus is in constant communication with each mitochondrion, 
centriole, golgi apparatus, ribosome, and endoplasmic reticulum, each of which has its 
own function in maintaining the overall homeostasis of the cell.
in fact, components of organisms as they have been described, viz., organelles, cells, 
organs, subsystems – as well as the organism itself – all would be considered living, 
emergent entities.
referring to the schematization of an organism as one huge triangle containing 
smaller triangles that was used in section 1, each one of those triangles—from biggest to 
smallest—represents a biologically emergent phenomenon. for example, although the 
organelles of a cell themselves are made up of physico-chemical entities, they engage 
in coordinated kinds of activities that benefit the overall homeostasis of the cell; so too, 
although kidney cells are made up of organelles, which are made up of physico-chemical 
entities, the kidney cells themselves engage in coordinated activities that benefit the 
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homeostasis of the kidney; and so on up the hierarchy of the mammal (see the final 
section of Kaneto, morrissey, mccracken, reyes, and Klahr, 1998).
8. PsYchoLogicaL emergence (BriefLY)
what about emergence at the psychological level? there is a huge amount of literature 
devoted to questions about the existence of psychological phenomena, and whether 
psychological phenomena supervene upon or emerge from neurobiological phenomena 
(for starters, see Kim, 1993, 2000; Lycan, 1995; crane, 2001; churchland, 1995; Buss, 
1999; cosmides and tooby, 1994; roth, 2000; arp, 2007a, 2007b; arp and terzis, 2008c). 
given space limitations, the subject merely can be glossed here. it is arguable that the 
psychological realm is an extension of the neurobiological and biological realms, and 
that mental states are emergent phenomena that are, in many ways, subject to the same 
laws as any other neurobiological and biological phenomena. more than a quarter of 
a century ago, sperry (1980) stated the position eloquently, noting that a psychological 
phenomenon is a “functional property of brain processing, constituted of neuronal and 
physicochemical activity, and embodied in, and inseparable from, the active brain” (p. 
204). Just as cellular process exhibit internal-hierarchical data exchange, data selectivity, 
informational intregration, as well as exchange of information with environments, so 
too, neurobiological and psychological processes exhibit analogously similar kinds 
of properties (also see arp, 2005b, 2007a, 2008a, 2008b). it has been argued that the 
components of an organism are emergent entities non-reducible to the physico-chemical 
parts of which they are composed based upon the way in which the components are 
organized to maintain the generalized homeostasis of this hierarchically organized 
living system. the psychological dimension associated with the brain’s activities can 
be considered as another level of emergent phenomena added to the hierarchy. this 
is so because cognition appears to be organized in such a way as to aid an animal in 
discriminating information in environments so as to fight, flee, feast, forage, etc.
however, the kind of end result or end product of cognition –although similar 
to other activities in the animal’s hierarchy in having generalized homeostasis as the 
goal – is different in that such a product is a psychological phenomenon that aids in 
generalized homeostasis. Just as the components at various levels of neurobiological and 
biological hierarchies, such as organelles, cells, tissues and organs, cannot be reduced 
to the physico-chemical parts of which they are composed, so too cognition, although 
dependent upon neurobiological processes, is not reducible to such processes (also 
see arp and terzis, 2008). the main reason why psychological phenomena are non-
reducible to neurobiological phenomena is the same reason why neurobiological and 
biological components are non-reducible to the physcio-chemical parts of which they 
are composed, viz., such components and phenomena emerge as a result of the way in 
which they are organized to maintain generalized homeostasis of the organism.
now, in arguing for hoV i am not advocate some “spooky stuff” principle (this 
terminology is borrowed from churchland, 1993) of internal “vitalism” or external 
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“design,” the likes of which might be put forward by an organicist or a creationist 
(see arp, 1998, 2002, 2007b). as was mentioned earlier, the property of internal-
hierarchical data exchange in an organism manifests upward causation, whereby the 
lower levels of the hierarchy exhibit causal influence over the higher levels. Likewise, 
the dual properties of data selectivity and informational integration manifest downward 
causation, whereby the higher levels of the hierarchy exhibit causal influence over the 
lower levels, in terms of control. consider that an organism like the human body is a 
complex multi-cellular entity made up of levels of independently organized entities that 
perform certain operations. these organized entities are hierarchically arranged from 
organ systems (e.g., the nervous system), composed of organs (brain, spinal cord, etc.), 
that are composed of tissues (nervous tissue), which are composed of cells (neurons, glial 
cells), each of which is composed of organelles (mitochondrion, nucleus, etc.), that are 
composed of organic molecules (carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, dna, etc.). each of these 
entities functions such that the operations at the lower levels contribute to the emergence 
of entities and their operations at the higher levels: because of the activities of organic 
molecules, it is possible for organelles and their attending activities at a higher level 
to emerge; and because of the activities of organelles, it is possible for cells and their 
attending activities at a higher level to emerge; and so on.
now, think of all of the complex upward and downward causal relations taking 
place when the human body simply gets up out of bed. Put crudely, the brain must 
exhibit downward causation, as a necessary condition, upon its own neuro-chemical 
constituents in order to cause the body to get up; while the neuro-chemical constituents 
must exhibit upward causation, as a necessary condition, for movement to occur in the 
first place. there is no “spooky” vitalism or design in any of this upward and downward 
causal interaction.
9. more than mere mechanism
hoV adds an important addition to one standard interpretation of a hierarchical 
mechanism. as was mentioned already, craver’s (2001) description of a mechanism 
hierarchy as some mechanism S, which is Ψ-ing, composed of smaller entity Xs, which 
are Φ-ing is commonplace in the literature. these Xs are little mechanisms themselves 
consisting of smaller entity Ps, which are σ-ing. this view has the benefit of describing 
some mechanism as a hierarchically organized system, in a non-spooky fashion, 
consisting of entities engaging in inter and intra-leveled causally-efficacious activities. 
in fact, craver’s view of a hierarchical mechanism maps onto my schematization of a 
hierarchically-organized system envisioned as nested triangles, and our two views have 
much in common.
however, the problem with his view of mechanisms is that it neglects the more 
specified kinds of organized homeostatic activities in which the processes of organismic 
hierarchies are engaged. it is arguable that physico-chemical entities – the so-called 
smaller entity Ps, which are σ-ing that make up the organelles, which are Φ-ing – 
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themselves are not coordinated in such a way so as to produce homeostatic results; they 
are not organized to do something, or achieve some result in this homeostatic manner. further, 
it is arguable that physico-chemical entities are not organized in hierarchical ways such 
that we could say they are engaged in particularized homeostatic processes contributing 
to a generalized homeostasis.
organisms are responsive to their environments in such a way that they can adapt 
to changes. a callous on your foot is a simple example of the endocrine subsystem of 
your body adapting to a change in its external environment. organisms, as well as 
the subsystems and processes of which they are composed, exhibit a certain amount 
of flexibility and malleability in relation to their internal and external environments. 
in fact, as we have already seen, the subsystems and processes of organisms produce 
particularized and generalized homeostasis, viz., a relatively constant coordination 
among the components of an organism, given the interaction of these components with 
environments internal to and external to the organism. as was intimated already, this 
property of adaptability in relation to environments that is yet another essential feature 
that distinguishes living entities, properties, or substances from nonliving ones. another 
way to say this is that the adaptability of processes and subsystems in organisms can 
be pointed to as a clear way in which to distinguish the biological from the physico-
chemical realms.
think of a rock. a rock would be classified as a nonliving, physico-chemical entity 
because it does not have this ability to adapt to environments and situations the way in 
which living, biological entities do. if a rock is hit by a hammer with a certain amount 
of force, it breaks up into pieces, the pieces fall where they may according to physico-
chemical laws, and that is the end of the story—this is its “response” to the environment. 
conversely, if one’s forearm is hit by a hammer such that a bone breaks, the various 
systems of the body go to work to repair the damage so that some form of homeostasis 
can be re-achieved. the body adaptively responds to this environmental pressure, and 
the hierarchy goes to work on fixing the problem.
further, if the bone does not heal correctly or the muscles surrounding it have 
atrophied because of the blow, the subsystems and processes of my body can compensate 
for the injury. if the hierarchy can’t fix the problem, it adjusts or re-adjusts, if necessary. 
homeostasis in an organism entails adaptability as a necessary condition; for it is the 
organism’s response to its ever-changing environment that will occasion the need for 
either particularized or generalized homeostasis. of course, biological entities are 
constructed of physico-chemical components and are subject to the same physico-
chemical laws as any other piece of matter in the world. however, biological entities, as 
hierarchically organized living systems, have this distinguishing property whereby the 
subsystems and processes adaptively respond to their environments in ways that other 
physico-chemical entities do not.
roBert arP 279
10. ePistemoLogicaL emergence
so far, a metaphysical form of emergence has been argued for whereby parts of a 
biological system are envisioned as genuine emergent entities, starting at the level of 
the organelles of the cell. a question may arise as to how it is that a corresponding 
epistemological form of emergence may be possible so as to describe the metaphysically 
emergent biological phenomena (also see arp, 2004a, 2004b). this question of the 
relationship between metaphysical and epistemological forms of emergence is central to 
any discussion of emergence/reduction as it would seem difficult to justify ontological 
claims without appealing to epistemological claims, and vice versa. given this intimate 
relationship between metaphysics and epistemology, it may be that once a particular 
ontic level has been identified as emergent, then a whole new set of concepts, theories, 
etc., will have to be introduced to account for the emergent phenomena.
the hoV endorsed with respect to the functioning of organisms can be described 
within a biological framework that utilizes the language of teleology/functionality. 
thankfully, this kind of language already is being used by biologists, psychologists, 
philosophers, and other researchers to describe biological phenomena (for example, see 
the essays in ariew, cummins, and Perlman, 2002; arp, 2006b; arp and ayala, 2008; 
arp and rosenberg, 2008)). as ruse (2004) has pointed out, researchers thinking about 
biological matters since aristotle cannot get around using the concepts and language of 
purpose, function, and organization to describe biological phenomena, even if to describe 
this phenomena as if it were teleologically organized. That researchers cannot get around 
describing biological phenomena as if it were organized with goals toward homeostasis 
may already be an indicator of an epistemological form of emergence. our descriptions 
of biological phenomena resist a reductive explanation to the levels of chemistry or 
physics. if one adopts a realist strategy for describing biological phenomena, or an as 
if  realist strategy (see rescher, 2005; arp, 2005c, 2005d), then it is easy to see how one 
could connect an epistemological form of emergence with a metaphysical form. here, 
the descriptions of biological phenomena resist reduction, and must be described with a 
set of emergent terms, precisely because that is the way biological phenomena actually 
are homeostatically organized out there in the world. this may be why we cannot seem 
to jettison the language of teleology/functionality from our vocabulary.
it seems that something is left out of the description of an organism if we say that, 
for example, a dog just is a mass made up of chemical properties having certain kinds 
of bonds, subject to laws of electromagnetism, gravity, etc. this kind of description 
works well for say, a rock, because we do not see the properties of a rock as engaged in 
coordinated kinds of activities contributing to hierarchies and producing homeostasis. 
we do not ask what the components of a rock are doing for the rock as whole, other 
than to say that the chemical bonds comprising its matter are of the kind that keep it 
solidified in some patch of space and time.
however, an organism like a dog would seem to require a different kind of description 
as an entity having components whose emergence is related to the coordination of those 
components and their homeostatic outcomes in a hierarchically organized system; 
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otherwise, one is in danger of underdescribing a dog’s subsystems and processes just as 
a mass made up of chemical properties having certain kinds of bonds, subject to laws 
of electromagnetism, gravity, etc. there is more to a description of a dog’s kidney, for 
example, than can be captured by the language of physical laws and chemical bonds. 
as a biologically emergent entity, the dog’s kidney has a specific function it performs 
in the dog’s digestive subsystem, functions in such a way as to be coordinated with the 
functioning of other organs in the digestive subsystem, and is related to other organs in 
the system as a whole in such a way so as to aid in the maintenance of the dog’s life.
11. concLUsion
i have argued that starting with the organelles that constitute a cell – and continuing 
up the hierarchy of components in processes and subsystems of an organism – there 
are clear instances of emergent biological phenomena that can be considered “living” 
entities. i put forward hoV as way to interpret the fact that the components and 
processes of an organism are organized to maintain homeostasis of the organism at the 
various levels in the hierarchy. that components of biological phenomena are organized 
to perform some function resulting in homeostasis marks them out to be living emergent 
entities distinguishable, in description and in reality, from the very physico-chemical 
processes of which they are composed. i described internal-hierarchical data exchange, 
data selectivity, informational integration, and environmental-organismic information 
exchange in order to proffer hoV. finally, i demonstrated that hoV comports well with 
the standard philosophical accounts of nomological and representational emergence. 
hopefully, i have made a minor contribution to the debate concerning what constitutes 
a living entity.
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